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NOTES
AN UNBORN CHILD'S RIGHT TO PROVE FILIATION:
Malek v. Yekani-Ford
A pregnant woman filed suit on behalf of herself and her unborn
child, seeking to establish the child's paternal filiation and to obtain sup-
port. The defendant alleged that since the plaintiff was legally married,
the unborn child was presumed to be the child of the plaintiff's husband.
The trial court dismissed the suit as premature since the child had yet
to be born. The supreme court reversed, reasoning that a curator of an
unborn child could file suit against the alleged father to establish filiation
and obtain prenatal and natal support. Malek v. Yekani-Ford, 422 So.
2d 1151 (La. 1982).
The Louisiana Civil Code accords beneficial property rights to an un-
born child. For example, an unborn child may inherit by intestate succes-
sion, and may have a curator appointed to take care of his estate.' He
also may recover workmen's compensation benefits from the employer
of his deceased father.2 No legal recognition is given to the child, however,
if such recognition would result in a detriment to him.3 For example,
the husband of the mother of a legitimate child can not disavow pater-
nity prior to birth.4
Not until the Malek case, however, had the Louisiana courts granted
an unborn child standing to sue his alleged father to establish filiation.
The majority began its analysis by determining that parental filiation, with
its consequent entitlement to support and heirship, is a property right of
an unborn child. It then concluded, relying on Civil Code article 21 and
excerpts from Planiol, 5 that the Louisiana Civil Code provides an unborn
child standing to assert his property rights. After specifying that an il-
legitimate and his representatives can claim natal expenses and support
from his biological father, the majority reasoned that since Louisiana
recognizes an unborn child's rights in property matters, there is no reason
to distinguish between natal and prenatal expenses and to postpone the
biological father's responsibility until birth.6 To strengthen this conclu-
sion, the court mentioned that an early resolution of paternity is in the
interest of both the state and the child, and that since a father can volun-
Copyright 1984, by Louisiana Law Review.
1. La. Civ. Code arts. 954, 29.
2. La. R.S. 23:1021(3) (Supp. 1984).
3. 1 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law pt. 1, no. 367, at 245 (1lth ed. La. St.
L. Inst. trans. 1959).
4. La. Civ. Code art. 189.
5. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3.
6. 422 So. 2d at 1153.
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tarily acknowledge an unborn child,7 an unborn child should be permit-
ted to judicially establish filiation with his father.'
A judgment of paternity necessarily establishes the obligation of sup-
port. This paper will first analyze an unborn child's right to support under
Louisiana law and will then analyze the wisdom of allowing a paternity
action to be instituted prior to birth.'
Unborn Child's Right to Support
Civil Code articles 28, 29, and 227 arguably provide a basis for the
right of an unborn child to obtain support. Article 28 provides: "Children
born dead are considered as if they had never been born or conceived."
Article 29 states: "Children in the mother's womb are considered, in
whatever relates to themselves, as if they were already born; thus the in-
heritances which devolve to them before their birth, and which may belong
to them, are kept for them, and curators are assigned to take care of
their estates for their benefit." And article 227 reads: "Fathers and
mothers, by the very act of marrying, contract together the obligation
of supporting, maintaining, and educating their children."
The drafters of Civil Code articles 28, 29, and 227 did not contemplate
an action for support being brought either prior to birth or by an il-
legitimate child. At the time the articles were drafted an illegitimate child
had no property rights other than a limited duty of support owed to him
by his parents under Civil Code article 240.0 Hence, article 29, which
gives an unborn child legal personality for property rights, was not in-
tended to apply to an illegitimate child. Articles 29 and 227 were not
intended to apply to an unborn child because article 209, which provided
the methods of proving paternity, primarily contemplated the use of
physical proof after the child's birth. ' ' But articles 28, 29, and 227 can
7. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, no. 1475, at 808.
8. 422 So. 2d at 1154.
9. Although the wisdom of allowing the illegitimate child in Malek to bring a pater-
nity action against a man other than the presumed father is questionable, this issue has
been discussed extensively by Professor Spaht and the judiciary and will not be addressed
in this note. See Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974); Fontenot v. Thierry, 422
So. 2d 586 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 868 (La. 1983); IMC Explora-
tion Co. v. Henderson, 419 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Spaht, The Work of
Appellate Courts, 1978-1979-Persons, 40 La. L. Rev. 550 (1980); Spaht, Developments
in the Law, 1979-1980-Persons, 41 La. L. Rev. 372, 380 (1981); Spaht, Developments in
the Law, 1980-1981- Persons, 42 La. L. Rev. 403, 405 (1982); Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest
Presumption Challenged: Speculations On Warren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell,
37 La. L. Rev. 59 (1976).
10. Civil Code article 240 provides that parents owe alimony to their illegitimate children,
when they are in need.
11. La. Civ. Code art. 209 (1870). Under this article, however, a child could possibly
prove paternity by facts occurring before his birth, such as concubinage at the time of
conception or an acknowledgement by the father that the pregnant mother is carrying his child.
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apply by analogy to the facts of Malek because under the equal protec-
tion clause illegitimate children arguably have the same right to support
as legitimate children. 2 Also, since these articles are quite old, 3 they can
be interpreted to accomplish present social objectives under existing
conditions.' 4 Historically, these articles were probably not intended to apply
to an unborn or illegitimate child, so they cannot be strictly construed.
One of the keys to acquiring some form of support for an unborn
child prior to birth is to read articles 28 and 29, as the court in Malek
did, to allow the child's right to be exercised before birth. To reach the
result of Malek, article 28 must be read as containing a resolutory condi-
tion. Thus, the unborn child, after establishing filiation with his biological
father, becomes the creditor of his biological father's obligation of prenatal
support subject to the resolutory condition of not being born viable.
Such a reading would be consistent with Civil Code articles 954 and 95516
which provide that an unborn child may participate in a succession sub-
ject to the resolutory condition of not being born alive. As the creditor
of an obligation subject to a resolutory condition, the unborn child can
execute his right to prove filiation as a prerequisite to obtaining support
even though the condition may still be accomplished.' 7 Civil Code article
29 gives an unborn child rights in whatever relates to himself and should
be read in "the most sweeping character."'" The article illustrates this
principle by providing that a child retains inheritances which devolve to
him before birth. Although the general concept embodied in the article
would apply most frequently to succession rights, it is certainly not limited
to such rights'9 and arguably includes the right to support. Thus, article
12. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), where the Supreme Court held that Texas
law denying the right of paternal support to illegitimate children while granting it to legitimate
children violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
Even if Civil Code article 227 does not apply to illegitimate children, the biological father
owes a limited duty to them under Civil Code article 240, which reads in part: "Fathers
and mothers owe alimony to their illegitimate children when they are in need."
13. The present article 28 was originally drafted in the Louisiana Digest of 1808, book
1, title i, article 28. The present article 29 is identical to article 29 of the Civil Code of
1825. Likewise, article 227 is identical to article 227 of the Civil Code of 1825.
14. Reig, Judicial Interpretation of Written Rules, 40 La. L. Rev. 49, 53-65 (1979).
15. As to whether a child is considered as born alive, see Civil Code articles 956 and 963.
16. The resolutory condition has different effects on support payments and succession
rights. Although an unborn child may participate in the succession of his forbear, he will
receive nothing should the resolutory condition of not being born viable occur. On the other
hand, support payments will already have been made before the occurrence of the condi-
tion. Whether the alleged father should be entitled to recoup the payments made if the
child is not born viable is discussed in text accompanying notes 74-79 infra.
17. See La. Civ. Code art. 2045.
18. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352, 360 (La. App. Orl. 1923).
19. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d at 360.
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29 would provide the unborn child with a right to support, and article
28 subjects that right to a resolutory condition that extinguishes the right
of the child not born alive.
Civil Code article 227 imposes a broad duty upon a father to support
his legitimate children, and arguably the equal protection clause extends
this obligation to illegitimate children as well.2" As the Malek court pointed
out, this duty should not await birth. The needs of an unborn child are
similar to those of one already born, as both require adequate nutrition
and medical care. Since the need for adequate health care and legal pro-
tection exists before birth, legal personality and the rights which flow from
it should be concomitant in time with those needs.2
Allowing support for a child prior to birth also serves the social goal
of providing the mother of a child with the means for adequate health
care during the period from conception to birth when it is most needed.
The important policy aspects of prenatal rights and care were recognized
over twenty years ago by the United Nations in its Declaration of the
Rights of the Child: "The child, by reason of his physical and mental
immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal
protection, before as well as after birth."22 Clearly, a father's legal obliga-
tion to support his children should not await birth as a policy matter.
Policy dictates that an unborn child be provided with support, and
the Civil Code arguably supports this conclusion. However, whether an
unborn child should be permitted to bring a paternity action to establish
the obligation for support, as was allowed in Malek, is questionable.
Paternity Action Prior to Birth
Civil Code article 209(C) states that a filiation proceeding "must be
brought within one year of the death of the alleged parent or within nine-
teen years of the child's birth, whichever first occurs." 23 This language
seems to suggest that the legislature intended a filiation action to await
birth. But the purpose of the article is to avoid the assertion of stale
claims and to protect the stability of property distributions from a suc-
cession. This purpose is evident from the last sentence of article 209(C)
which states that "if the filiation proceeding is not timely instituted, the
child may not thereafter establish his filiation." 2 The evidence which
would be used to establish an unborn child's filiation would be far from
stale.
20. See supra note 12.
21. Keyerlingk, A Right of the Unborn Child to Prenatal Care-The Civil Law Perspec-
tive, 13 Revue de Droit Universit6 de Sherbrook 49, 64 (1982).
22. Preamble, Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 14th Session of U.N. General
Assembly, F.A. Res. 1286, 14 UN.W. GAOR Supp. 16, at 19 (U.N. Doc. A1435) (1959)
(emphasis added).
23. La. Civ. Code art. 209(C).
24. Id.
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Although Civil Code article 209 does not contradict the result of
Malek, a stronger reason exists for questioning the wisdom of permitting
an unborn child to bring a paternity action: blood-test data, perhaps the
most crucial evidence, may not be available prior to birth. A columnist
once wrote: "It took the testimony of a sage, an oracle, a drunken party
goer, a messenger, a sheepherder and his own wife before Oedipus could
figure out who his father was." '2 5 A judge usually has less evidence
available than did Oedipus to determine the father of a child in a pater-
nity proceeding.2 6 However, a judge today may have the benefit of blood
tests, which Oedipus did not have. Blood-grouping tests have been proven
to be "the most certain and the most invaluable item of evidence that
can be produced in an affiliation proceeding," 27 because the "scientific
evidence of nonpaternity, gathered impersonally and objectively in the
laboratory, has proven infinitely superior to mere testimonial evidence." 2
In order to fully comprehend the role blood-grouping tests play in
paternity proceedings, an examination of the types and reliability of the
various tests is necessary. Many blood-grouping systems exist, but all of
them can be classified into four basic groups: (1) those based on the red
cells; (2) those based on serum proteins; (3) those based on enzymes; and
(4) those based on leukocyte antigens (HLA).29 Depending on the prob-
ability of paternity desired, any or all of the available blood-groupings
can be run.3" When tests are run on the red blood cells alone, only about
75 percent of the falsely accused men could be excluded from being the
father of the child in question. 3' If HLA tests alone are run, the exclu-
sion rate is 95 percent,32 and this figure will undoubtedly rise in the
future.33 The combined results of red blood cells and HLA testing have
25. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1981, at A3, col. 1.
26. Beaudoin v. Tilley, 110 Misc. 2d 696, 696; 442 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1981).
27. 1 S. Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings § 901 (rev. ed. 1980).
28. Id.
29. N. Bryant, Disputed Paternity-The Value and Application of Blood Tests (1980);
Paternity Testing: A Seminar Presented by the Committee on Technical Workshops of the
American Association of Blood Banks (H. Silver ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Paternity
Testing]; Sussman, Up to Date Blood Testing for Paternity and Non-Paternity, 24 Trauma
5-24 (June 1982).
30. Id.
31. Sussman, supra note 29; 1 S. Schatkin, supra note 27, at 8-29.
32. Sussman, supra note 29.
33. D. Bodmar & L. Thompson, Population Genetics and Evolution of the HLA System:
HLA and Disease 280 (1977).
One commentator wrote:
The HLA tests will, in the course of time, become the most powerful tool for
the determination of paternity or nonpaternity. In fact, the probability of exclu-
sion by HLA, will be greater than the cumulative probability for all other systems.
Science has progressed to a point where ultimately in virtually every case where
the accused is innocent, there will be an exclusion. And a man not excluded after
complete testing will undoubtedly be the actual father of the child.
1 S. Schatkin, supra note 27, § 8.08.
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an exclusion rate of 98 percent.3 4 If tests for serum proteins and red blood
cell enzymes are added, the exclusion rate for the falsely accused man
is 99.9995 percent." However, absolute positive proof of paternity can-
not be established by any known blood test.36
Since blood-grouping tests can be critical evidence in a paternity trial,
the wisdom of allowing an unborn child to bring a paternity action will
in part depend upon whether accurate and safe blood-grouping tests can
be run on a fetus. At the time of birth, many of the red cell groups
and the serum protein groups are not fully developed for testing.
Therefore, to postpone testing for these antigens until several months after
birth would be advantageous.37 The HLA tests, on the other hand, can
be run as soon as amniocentesis can be performed on the mother. But
the possible risks associated with performing amniocentesis are present,
and the results of prenatal HLA testing are not as reliable as testing at
birth.38 Also, most experts recommend that the red cell tests, for which
most of the blood groups do not develop until a few months after birth,
be performed first. This procedure is recommended because the red cell
tests are easy to perform, relatively inexpensive, and will sometimes ex-
clude an alleged father where the HLA tests will not.36
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 allows the court upon its own in-
itiative to order a blood test. The statute also gives any party to a pater-
nity proceeding the right to file a motion for blood tests, and requires
the court to grant the motion unless it would unduly delay the
proceedings. 0 If the court appoints an expert witness, it can order the
parties to pay the expert's compensation in any proportion it prescribes
or it can tax the compensation to the parish. If the expert is called by
34. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 31.
36. See generally Paternity Testing, supra note 29; Jaffee, Comment on the Judicial
Use of HLA Paternity Test Results and Other Statistical Evidence: A Response to Terasaki,
17 J. Fam. L. 457 (1978-1979).
37. Sussman, supra note 29; Silver, supra note 36.
38. Telephone interview with Dr. John Danilous of the UCLA Medical Center-
Laboratory of Molecular Biology (Oct. 10, 1983).
39. Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not.Excluded by
ABO Testing, 16 J. Fain. L. 543, 554 (1977-1978); Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present
Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 Fain. L.Q. 247, 258 (1976).
40. La. R.S. 9:396 (Supp. 1984) reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in any civil action
in which paternity is a relevant fact, or in an action en desaveu, the court, upon
its own initiative or upon request made by or on behalf of any person whose
blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party to the action made at a
time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child,
and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to
such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity against such party or
enforce its order if the rights of others and the rights of justice so require.
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a party but not appointed by the court, the compensation is paid by the
party calling the expert.
4
If an unborn child brings a paternity action and the alleged father
moves for a continuance until blood tests can be performed, Louisiana
courts should grant the continuance in light of the mandatory wording
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 and the fact that blood tests are so
highly determinative of paternity. Since the test can be performed shortly
after birth, the continuance would not unduly delay the proceeding. The
alleged father's right to demand a blood test arguably outweighs any right
the child may have to bring a paternity action prior to birth and the state's
interest to decide paternity as soon as possible. But in Malek the alleged
father apparently did not file a motion for blood tests, and the court
did not discuss whether or not the unborn child's paternity action would
be affected by a motion for a blood test. The issue, therefore, remains
open as to what a Louisiana court would do if an unborn child brings
a paternity action and the alleged father demands a blood test.
Treatment in Other States
The procedures adopted by other states which permit a paternity ac-
tion to be filed prior to birth may provide guidance to Louisiana courts
in dealing with this issue. Although few states have considered the prob-
lem, the states that allow a paternity action to be filed prior to birth
can be classified into three groups: (1) those states in which a paternity
action is automatically continued until after birth with no support payments
pending the birth available to the mother or child; (2) those states in which
the paternity action is continued until after birth only if the father demands
blood tests, and no support payments pending the birth are available to
the mother or child; and (3) those states in which support payments pend-
ing the birth can be acquired by the mother and child from the alleged
father regardless of whether the paternity action is automatically continued
or only continued upon a demand for a blood test. 2
The first group consists of the states that have adopted the Uniform
Parentage Act. Under section 6(e) all actions brought before the birth
of the child are stayed until after birth, except for service of process and
the taking of depositions.43 Six states have adopted this section and have
no provision for support payments before the issue of paternity is tried."
41. La. R.S. 9:397.2 (Supp. 1984). The alleged father's right to a blood test should
not be conditioned on his ability to pay the expenses of a blood test. If such were the
case, an indigent defendant who could not afford the expenses and would consequently
be denied a defense could attack the statute on constitutional grounds.
42. See infra notes 44 & 49.
43. Unif. Parentage Act § 6(e), 9A U.L.A. 587 (1973).
44. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 584-6(d) (1976); Minn. Stat. § 257.57(5) (1982); Mont. Code
Ann. § 40-6-107(4) (1982); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-17-05(5) (1981); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 26.26.060(6) (Supp. 1983); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-104(e) (1983).
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Although California has adopted the Uniform Parentage Act,4 5 it speci-
fically allows a paternity action to be brought before birth."'
The second group consists primarily of the states which have adopted
section 6 of the Uniform Act on Paternity. Under this section, if a pater-
nity action is brought while the mother is pregnant, the trial cannot be
held prior to birth unless the alleged father consents to a trial before
birth. 7 The Commissioner's Note makes it clear that the section is in-
tended to prevent a trial before blood test evidence becomes available. 4
Six states have adopted this section.4 9 Two other states, New York and
North Carolina, have reached this position through jurisprudence.5" The
states that have adopted the Uniform Act on Paternity have no provision
allowing the pregnant mother or the unborn child to recover support
payments prior to a trial on the issue of paternity. And the courts of
New York and North Carolina have made it clear that the defendant's
substantial right to a blood test prevents him from being liable for any
support until a trial with the blood test groupings can be conducted.'
The two states in the third group differ from the other states which
permit the filing of a paternity action prior to birth primarily because
the defendant can be compelled to pay support to the mother and un-
born child regardless of whether the trial on the issue of paternity must
await birth.52 Colorado, the first of these two states, has a blood testing
statute which, like Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396, is based on the
Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity. 3 The Colorado
Supreme Court, in interpreting its statute, has held that requiring a defen-
dant to proceed to trial on the issue of paternity without the benefit of
blood tests is a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5" California is the other state falling within this final group,
and its procedure differs from Colorado's in only one respect: while the
unborn child's action in Colorado is automatically continued until after
45. Cal. Civ. Code § 7000 (West 1983).
46. Cal. Civ. Code § 7006() (West 1983).
47. Unif. Act on Paternity § 6, 9A U.L.A. 626 (1960).
48. Unif. Act on Paternity § 6, 9A U.L.A. 633, commissioners' note (1980).
49. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 406.071 (Baldwin 1981); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 276
(1981); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-9-19 (1973); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168-A(5) (1964); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 15-8-10 (1981); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-6 (1977).
50. Fowler v. Rizzuto, 205 Misc. 1088, 121 N.Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y.C. Ct. Sp. Sess. 1953);
State v. Morgan, 31 N.C. App. 128, 228 S.E.2d 523 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976); Beaudoin v.
Tilley, 110 Misc. 2d 696, 442 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981); Grant v. Konis, 203
Misc. 1089, 122 N.Y.S.2d 21 (N.Y.C. Ct. Sp. Sess. 1953); Anne E.S. v. Antonios S., 115
Misc. 2d 192, 454 N.Y.S.2d 50 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
51. Id.
52. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-7-103(3) (1982); Cal. Civ. Code § 4357 (West 1983).
53. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126 (1982).
54. Franklin v. District Ct. of 10th Jud. Dist., 172 Colo. 189, 571 P.2d 1072 (1977),
reh'g denied, Nov. 21, 1977 (en banc).
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birth, California courts will not stay the proceedings unless the alleged
father demands a blood test. 5
Justice Traynor, of the California Supreme Court, analyzed the
prevalent state legislation and laid down the nature and purpose of the
action for child support pending birth in Carbone v. Superior Court.6
He described the proceeding as follows:
The plaintiff, upon the hearing of the order to show cause, must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is
her father before he can be ordered to pay her support, costs
of suit, or counsel fees pending the trial of the issues of the case.
The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard and to
present his evidence. Then, even though the court upon a
preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing issues the
order, its implied finding of paternity is not res judicata nor deter-
minative of the issue of parentage at trial. The proceeding is
merely a hearing upon an order to show cause for the purpose
of determining plaintiff's right to an award pendente lite, and
while defendant may put the jurisdictional prerequisite of paren-
tage in issue, the evidence produced by the parties need not be
so extensive as at the trial of the action. The resulting judgment
is temporary in effect; except as to payments already accrued
thereunder, its operation terminates upon the final determination
of the action or upon order of the court.57
Although the sections of the California Code pertinent to the discussion
in Carbone have been altered since the decision, 8 none of the legislative
changes have materially affected the unborn child's right to support,59
and the order to show cause is still the procedural device used to enforce
this right in California.6"
55. Cal. Evid. Code § 892 (West 1983); Cal. Civ. Code § 7006(f) (West 1983).
56. Carbone v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 768, 117 P.2d 872 (1941).
57. Carbonne, 18 Cal. 2d at 768, 17 P.2d at 872.
58. Cal. Civ. Code § 4357 (West 1983). The current statute allowing payments provides:
During the pendency of any dissolution, child custody, or child support proceeding
the superior court may order the husband or wife, or father or mother, as the
case may be, to pay any amount that is necessary for the support and maintenance
of the wife or husband and for the support, maintenance and education of the
children, as the case may be. An order made pursuant to this section shall not
prejudice the rights of the parties or children with respect to any subsequent order
which may be made. Any such order may be modified or revoked at any time
except as to any amount that may have accrued prior to the date of filing of
the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or revoke.
59. City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 87, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 45 (1978).
60. City & County of San Francisco, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 90, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 46;
Richter v. Superior Court, 214 Cal. App. 2d 821, 29 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1963); Suay v. Superior
Court, 147 Cal. App. 2d 764, 305 P.2d 990 (1957).
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A subsequent California decision recognized that the duty of the trial
court in an order to show cause for support prior to the birth of the
child involves a weighing of conflicting considerations. An early hearing
produces the risk that a defendant will be burdened with expenses for
a child which he has not fathered. However, postponing the hearing until
after the child's birth involves the risk that, for lack of adequate funds
for medical and other prenatal expenses, the child may not receive proper
prenatal care. 6 ' The trial court must, therefore, consider the financial posi-
tion of the pregnant woman and her ability to pay prenatal expenses.
If she can afford adequate prenatal care, the alleged father's interest in
not having to support a child which may not be his and the court's in-
terest in not having to go through both a prenatal hearing and a postnatal
trial arguably justify postponing any judicial action until after the child's
birth.
A Proposal
California's procedure equitably balances the interests of the parties
in a paternity proceeding. The unborn child in need is provided support
during the critical period of pregnancy, yet the defendant's substantial
right to demand a blood test is not impaired. The equitable approach
would seemingly fit well within the present law of Louisiana. Since ac-
cording to Malek an unborn child can bring a paternity action and under
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:396 a defendant to a paternity proceeding
has the right to a blood test, Louisiana is arguably in line with California
and several other states in that the paternity proceeding can be tried before
the child's birth unless a party to the suit demands a blood test. But
whether this will be the Louisiana position remains an open question
because in Malek the alleged father apparently did not file a motion for
blood tests, and the court did not discuss whether or not the unborn child's
paternity action would be affected by such a motion.
Louisiana could permit the pregnant woman to seek support pending
the birth of the child through a rule to show cause under article 2592(8)
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Although Colorado and California have
provided for support pending the birth by statute, 6 Louisiana need not
adopt such a statute because authority for allowing support pending the
birth can be found in the Civil Code. 3 Through these Civil Code provi-
sions, Louisiana could develop a procedure for support pending the birth
61. Richter v.- Superior Court, 214 Cal. App. 2d 821, 825, 29 Cal. Rptr. 826, 829 (1963).
62. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-7-103(3) (1982) ("The court may enter a temporary support
order, to remain effective pending a final disposition of the proceeding."). For the Califor-
nia statute, see supra note 58.
63. See generally supra text accompanying notes 10-22.
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by an unborn child similar to that fashioned by Justice Traynor in
California."
By adopting such a procedure in Louisiana, however, certain prob-
lems would arise under the Civil Code which deserve mention. First, if
the mother was never married to the alleged father, she should be able
to bring an action for support pending birth as tutrix of the child under
Civil Code article 256.6 If a single mother can maintain an action for
support pending birth for an illegitimate child, a married, 66 divorced, or
separated mother should likewise be permitted to bring an action for sup-
port of a child presumed to be legitimate. But the necessity for the action
may not be as crucial to the divorced or separated mother since the mother
and child may have a form of support in the mother's claim for alimony
under Civil Code article 148 or 160, or claim for support under article
119.67
If the pregnant mother is separated or divorced, she should be able
to bring the action as tutrix of the child under Civil Code article 250.66
Although article 250 provides that tutorship belongs to the custodial parent,
it should not be difficult for a pregnant mother to get legal custody of
her child. In Simon v. Calvert, 69 in order to allow the mother to claim
child support before qualifying as tutrix, the court held that a judgment
of child support was the property of the custodial parent. Therefore, the
mother could bring the support action in her own name. Viewed either
way, the mother would be the proper party to bring the suit. According
to Simon, if the mother sues in her own name, then Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:291"° will bar the action if the mother and father are living
64. See supra text accompanying note 57.
65. See La. Civ. Code art. 256 ("The mother is of right the tutrix of her illegitimate
child not acknowledged by the father, or acknowledged by him alone without her
concurrence.").
66. However, if the child is the legitimate child of living parents who are not divorced
or separated, the father is the proper party to sue to enforce a right of the child under
Code of Civil Procedure article 683. This would include the child's right to support under
Civil Code article 227.
67. La. Civ. Code arts. 119, 148, 160.
68. See Civil Code article 250, which provides in pertinent part: "Upon divorce or
judicial separation from bed and board of parents, the tutorship of each minor child belongs
of right to the parent under whose care he or she has been placed or to whose care he
or she has been entrusted ...... An analogy can be drawn with Civil Code article 252,
since the separation or divorce can be analogized to the death of the husband and since
the appointment of a curator is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the unborn
child. But such a curator will presumably not be the mother since at the birth of the child
such curator will become the undertutor, whereas the mother will of right become the tutrix
if she aquires legal custody from a court.
69. 289 So. 2d 567 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). See also In re Jones, 337 So. 2d 283
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Coleman v. Coleman, 209 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
70. La. R.S. 9:291 ("Unless judicially separated, spouses may not sue each other ex-
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together; the action will not be barred if the mother and father are
divorced, living separate and apart, or judically separated. If the mother
sues under article 250 as tutrix of the unborn child, then the action will
be barred by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:57171 unless the spouses are
judically separated or divorced.
A more difficult problem would arise if a married woman sued her
husband. If the courts extended the rationale of Simon to this situation,
then the mother could bring an action in her name. As mentioned in the
previous paragraph, such an action by the nondivorced mother will be
barred by 9:291 only if the spouses are living together. If the courts do
not intend Simon to cover this situation, then even though the mother
might, by analogy, qualify as tutrix of the child because the father failed
or refused to act for the child,72 such an action would be barred under
9:571 because it would be instituted during the marriage. The action would
not be barred by 9:571 if the mother could get a judicial separation or
divorce.
Another problem would arise if the baby dies in the womb, and
blood testing evidence cannot be obtained to aid in determining whether
the defendant paying support is actually the father. Under a strict reading
of Civil Code articles 28 and 29, the mother would have to return the
support payments73 because the death of the child accomplishes the
resolutory condition which retroactively extinguishes the obligation of
support." But since the drafters of these articles did not contemplate this
situation, 7 the articles need not be strictly construed. And in the case
previously mentioned, if the support is the property of the mother,76 these
articles would not apply.
The Civil Code imposes a broad obligation on the father to support
his children.77 If applied to the unborn, the fact that the child died before
birth would not change the fact that an obligation of support was owed
to the unborn.
Recall that under the California procedure, a judge has initially found
cept for causes of action arising out of . .. the custody of a child or alimony for his
support while the spouses are living separate and apart, although not judicially separated.").
71. La. R.S. 9:571 ("The child who is not emancipated cannot sue: (1) Either parent
during the continuance of their marriage, when the parents are not judicially separated ....").
72. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4502 ("The mother shall have the authority of the father
during such time as the father is mentally incompetent, committed, interdicted, imprisoned,
or an absentee. Moreover, with permission of the judge, the mother may represent the minor
whenever the father fails or refuses to do so .... ").
73. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2301, 2306-2307.
74. For the text of articles 28 and 29, see supra text following note 9; see also La.
Civ. Code arts. 2041, 2045.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
76. See supra text accompanying note 69.
77. La. Civ. Code arts. 227, 240.
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at a contradictory hearing based on some evidence (but not blood testing
data) that the defendant was the father, and consequently ordered
payments pending the birth. After the death of the child, no more evidence
is available than was presented at the rule to show cause. Therefore, since
a judge has found that, based on all available evidence, the defendant
was the father, to deny the father recovery of the payments already made
is not unreasonable. Further support for this argument can be found by
drawing an analogy to the situation in which the wife gets more alimony
pendente lite than a court later finds she deserved. In such a situation
the husband does not get any of the payments back.78
A similar problem will arise if the mother gets an abortion after the
hearing in which support pending the birth was awarded. The same analysis
that applied where the child died of natural causes would apply in this
situation. Since a mother can legally choose to have an abortion,79 she
should not be penalized for making this choice, and the father should
not receive a windfall. Realistically, a large amount of support would not
accrue before the abortion because the mother will likely get the abortion
as soon as possible." Also, any support that would accrue would be
reduced by the attorneys' fees necessary to pursue the action.
The final problem is the situation in which a mother gets a judgment
for support pending the birth, and subsequent to the birth, a trial with
blood testing data excludes paternity. The situation would seem to be the
payment of a thing not due, thus allowing the defendant to be reimbursed
under Civil Code article 2301.8 The father will have paid support even
though he owed no such obligation. Allowing reimbursement would
discourage false suits. As previously mentioned,82 when a prior alimony
pendente lite judgment is found to be excessive, courts do not allow
recovery of the excess paid. But the alimony pendente lite situation can
be distinguished from the support pending birth. In the former, the pay-
ing spouse owed an obligation to the other spouse but merely paid more
than should have been required; in the latter, the alleged father made
payments even though no obligation was owed at all.
As can be seen, the judiciary will have great flexibility in establishing
the support pending birth and resolving the issues which arise therefrom.
If greater certainty is desired, the legislature can adopt a statute patterned
after California's model" and Traynor's decision in Carbone v. Superior
78. Langham v. Langham, 381 So. 2d 1284 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); see also Frederic
v. Frederic, 302 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974).
79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80. See La. R.S. 40:1299.35.1(3), 1299.35.3, 1299.35.4(A) (Supp. 1983).
81. La. Civ. Code art. 2301 ("He who receives what is not due to him, whether he
receives it through error or knowingly, obliges himself to restore it to him from whom
he has unduly received it.").
82. See supra text accompanying note 78.
83. See supra note 58.
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Court.14 But a statute is not a necessity since the Louisiana statutory
scheme provides adequate support for such an action and for potential
solutions to the resulting problems.
Conclusion
Malek held that a curator of an unborn child could file suit against
the alleged father to establish filiation and obtain support. Although the
wisdom of permitting an unborn child to bring a paternity action is ques-
tionable, the Civil Code supports the right of an unborn child to some
form of prenatal support. Whether the result of Malek may be altered
if the alleged father demands a blood test under Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396 is an unresolved issue. Arguably, the alleged father's substantial
right under this statute would outweigh whatever right the child may have
to try the action prior to birth. Louisiana could adopt a procedure similar
to California's, thereby balancing the interests involved by continuing the
unborn child's action until after birth if the alleged father demands a
blood test and alternative means of support are available. The curator
of the unborn child will still be provided an opportunity to sue for sup-
port pending the birth if support from the alleged father is necessary.
Although problems will arise from such a procedure, the Civil Code is
adequately equipped to resolve them in an equitable manner.
Roy Edward Blossman
84. 18 Cal. 2d 768, 117 P.2d 872 (1941). For discussion, see supra text accompanying
note 57.
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